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RESTRICTIONS INHERENT IN THE PATENT
MONOPOLY: A COMPARATIVE CRITIQUE
RIICARD M. BTIXAUIM f
It is commonly asserted dogma that no antitrust problem can
arise from the exploitation of restrictions inherent in the legal patent
monopoly.' The catalogue of these restrictions varies-at different
times it has included such examples as licenses to manufacture, use,
and sell in only a part of the territory for which the patent was granted,
licenses to manufacture, use, and sell only one of the products covered
by a product patent's claims, and even licenses to manufacture, use,
and sell only at prices set by the licensor. The fallacy of the
maxim is clearly demonstrated by the treatment of price fixing and
tie-in restrictions in American decisions.2 Yet in various ways courts
still give it currency, and recently it has gained renewed vitality in
the legislation of the European Economic- Community 3 Both the
t Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. A.B. 1950, LL.B.
1952, Cornell University; LL.M. 1953, University of California. Member, New York
and California Bars.
1 See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). For recent
statements, see Schumacher, Die Durchffihrung der Artikel 85 und 86 des Rom-
Vertrages, 12 WmTSCHArr UND Wzr-EW,. [hereinafter cited as WuW] 475 (1962) ;
Tetzner, Die Ersch.3pfung des Patentrechts, 15 NEuE JJRISTISCHE WOCaaFSCnaIMr
[hereinafter cited as NJW] 2033, 2036 (1962).
2 See, e.g., Switzer Bros. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 851 (1962); Newburgh Moire Co, v. Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283
(3d Cir. 1956).
3 Treaty for the Establishment of the" European Economic Community, March 25,
1957 [hereinafter cited as Rome Treaty], 298 U.N.T.S. 14 (1958). See also 50 Am.
J. INT'L L. 865 (1957).
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much discussed Regulation 17 of the Council of Ministers 4 and the
ancillary Commission Announcement of December 21, 1962,5 in
essence purport to free these "inherent restrictions" from the reach
of the Community's antitrust law.
This Article will attempt to demonstrate not only the error of
the dogma, but its uselessness.
I. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: ANTITRUST LAW
AND PATENT LICENSING
The antitrust provisions of the treaty establishing the European
Economic Community, especially article 85, Regulation 17 of the
Council of Ministers, and the December 21, 1962, Announcement of
the Commission seem unduly solicitous of patent rights. Although in
fact the situation proves complicated, a satisfactory accommodation of
patent rights and antitrust principles has not been achieved by this
legislation. The treaty provision itself is almost as general and
programmatic as the Sherman Act; even the exemption possibilities
are phrased in general terms.' Regulation 17, on the other hand, de-
votes a great deal of attention to the question of patent licenses." In
general the regulation sets up a scheme whereby only the Commission
can grant the benefits of an exemption from antitrust regulation under
4 Regulation 17, Feb. 21, 1962, 1962 Journal Officiel des Communaut~s Euro-
pOennes [hereinafter cited as J.O.C.E.] 204, as amended, Regulation 59, July 10,
1962, 1962 J.O.C.E. 1655, CCH 1963 CommoN MKT. REP. 2401-2631.
5 Appended to Regulation 153, Dec. 24, 1962, 1962 J.O.C.E. 2922. See also the
abortive effort to set out a general exemption scheme in 1962 J.O.C.E. 2627 as cor-
rected 1962 J.O.C.E. 2687, and more recently, the efforts to promulgate a categorical
exemption scheme by means of a regulation of the Council of Ministers. See Euro-
pean Parliament, Doc. No. VI/Commission (1964), discussed in Buxbaum, Patent
Licensing: A Case Study on Antitrust Regulation Within the European Economic
Community, 9 ANTITRUST BUL. 101, 144 (1964). The latter has just been pro-
mulgated. See note 142 infra.
6 Rome Treaty, art. 85 (3):
However, the provisions of paragraph (1) may be declared inapplicable to:
any agreement or category of agreements between enterprises, any decision
or category of decisions of associations of enterprises, and any concerted prac-
tice or category of concerted practices, which contribute to the improve-
ment of the production or distribution of commodities or to the promotion of
technological or economic progress, while reserving an appropriate share of
the resulting profit to the consumers and without:
(a) imposing on the enterprises involved any restrictions not indispen-
sable for the attainment of these objectives, or
(b) enabling such enterprises to eliminate competition in respect of a
substantial portion of the commodities involved.
Translation from Riesenfeld, The Protection of Competition, in 2 AMERicAN ENTER-
PRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MAur: A LEGAL PROmIE 200-01 (Stein &
Nicholson ed. 1962). Unless otherwise indicated all translations are by the author
of the present Article.
7 See Deringer, Kommentar zum EWG-Kartellrecht (in 1962-1965 issues of
WuW). See also Ladas, Antitrust Law in the Common Market With Special
Reference to Industrial Property Agreements, 23 OHIo ST. L.J. 709 (1962).
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article 85(3) to restrictive arrangements that otherwise fall within
the sanction of article 85(1), and this only upon timely notification
of the Commission of these arrangements.' A different and less
stringent approach is taken to certain less "dangerous" types of agree-
ments, including some patent licenses. Article 4(2) of the regulation
enumerates arrangements for which no notification deadline is set.
These can be submitted at any time in the future without prejudicing
their acceptance.' These "nonnotifiable" agreements-agreements
which may but need not be submitted-include:
restraint[s] on . . . rights of any person acquiring or using
industrial property rights-particularly patents, utility
models, registered designs or trademarks-or on the rights
of any person entitled, under a contract, to acquire or use
manufacturing processes or knowledge relating to the utiliza-
tion or application of industrial techniques. 10
The last nine words qualify both the patent and know-how licenses
mentioned. It is therefore a logical, if negative, inference from this
listing that there are other "lesser" restraints-those inherent in the
patent itself-which not only can be left unnotified, but which do not
fall within the purview of article 85 at all. This inference was con-
firmed by a Practical Guide, issued by the Commission in the summer
of 1962." This document, which attempted by illustration to define
related (and therefore nonnotifiable) and unrelated (notifiable) re-
straints, separated both types from what it labeled "inherent restric-
tions." The last group was listed in detail in the Announcement of
8 For agreements existing before the regulation went into effect (March 13,
1962) there was a notification deadline of February 1, 1963, with some exceptions.
Regulation 17, arts. 4, 5, 1962 J.O.C.E. 206-07, CCH 1963 CommoN MxT. REP.
fIff 2431, 2441. For new agreements, oddly enough, there is no express deadline by
which notification must be given if an exception is ever to be obtainable-and it is by
no means clear that a deadline is even implied. It is conceivable, though not reason-
able in light of the stricter treatment of old agreements, that the Commission can be
notified of new agreements whenever the parties thereto decide to apply for any
exemption. See Buxbaum, Incomplete Federalism: Jurisdiction Over Antitrust Mat-
ters in the European Economic Community, 52 CAl.i. L. REv. 56, 71 (1964).
9 This step was taken for administrative purposes, to save the Commission's
limited manpower for the consideration of more important cartel arrangements and
for investigatory activities. See Linssen, The Antitrust Rules of the European Eco-
nomic Community, 18 REcORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 289 (1963). The temporary moratorium
may be rescinded in the future if staffing and similar considerations permit, although
this probably will not occur within the next few years. VerLoren van Themaat,
Gedanken zur Wettbewerbspolitik im Gemeinsamen Markt, 13 WuW 555 (1963).
10Regulation 17, art. 4(2) (ii) (b), CCH 1963 CommoN MKT. REP. 2431.
11 Service de Presse et D'Information des Communaut6s Europlennes, Guide
Pratique Concernant les Articles 85 et du Traiti Instituant la C.E.E. et Leurs
R~glements D'Application. See the English version in CCH 1963 CommoN MKT.
REP. 1 2701-37.
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December 21,12 which was intended by the Commission to place these
restrictions outside the scope of article 85:
(1) a restriction to one or more of the types of exploitation
of the invention (manufacture, use or sale) contem-
plated by the patent law;
(2) a restriction (a) on the manufacture of the patented
product, or (b) on the use of the patented process-to a
certain technical area;
(3) a quota restriction concerning number of items or
usages;
(4) a restriction of patent use in regard to:
(a) Duration (shorter license period than the patent)
(b) Territory (geographical or by firm)
(c) Person (prohibition of assignment or sublicensing, etc.).
The Commission obviously and consciously relied upon the
German cartel law to sanctify this "inherent rights" concept.3 Indeed,
most commentators have automatically made reference to this detailed
statute for the substantive content of the "inherent restraints" phrase.'
4
Section 20(1) of the German statute, which condemns patent licenses
containing restrictions that go beyond the scope of the patent, lists a
group of restrictions that by legislative fiat are declared to be within
the patent and therefore not covered by the statute-restrictions also
involving production quotas, duration, territory, scope, or method
of use.
It can be argued, however, that the German statute represents an
expression of policy concerning the desired reach of the antitrust pro-
hibitions,' 5 while the Commission seems to regard the December An-
12 See 1962 J.O.C.E. 2922.
13 Law of July 27, 1957, [1957] 1 Bundesgesetzblatt 1081 (Ger.). Compare
VerLoren van Themaat, supra note 9, at 565.
14 See, e.g., Deringer, Kommentar m~i EWG-Kartellrecht VO Nr. 17 Art. 4
Anmerkungen 16 und 17, 13 WuW 90-91 (1963) ; Becker, Vertical Agreements under
the EEC "Antitrust" Law, in Tim ANTITRUST STRUCTURE OF THE: EUROPEAN Com-
moNr MARxEr 88, 119 (Crowley ed. 1963). Compare Ladas, sMpra note 7, at 729.
15 Cf. Begriindung zu dem Entwurf eines Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrinkun-
gen, App. I, Drucksache No. 1158, Deutscher Bundestag, 2. Wahlperiode, Jan. 22, 1955
(explanation by the Ministry of Economics of the draft of this section) in MfTlLmE-
HENNEBERG & SCHWARTZ, GESETZ GEGEN WErTBEWERBSBEScHRANKUNGEN; KOM-
MENTAR 1057, 1089 (1958) (not reprinted in 1963 edition) ; GfiNTHER, SYSTEMATIScEEF
DARSTELLUNG WETTBEWERBSBESCHRNKENDER ERSCHEINUNGSFORMEN IN AUSTAUSCH-
VERTRAGEN ZWISCHEN EINZELUNTERNEHMEN UNTER BERfJCKSICHTIGUNG DES GESETZES
GEGEN WETTBEVERBSBESCHRXNKUNGEN 71-72 (Dissertation K61n 1960); Lemhoefer,
Die Verwaltungspraxis des Bundeskartellamtes bei Erlaubnisbeschliissen nach § 20
Abs. 3 (§ 21 Abs. 1) GWB, 66 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEDERRECHT
[hereinafter cited as GRUR] 573, 589-90 (1964). But see M6hring, Dekartellisierung
und Lizenzvertrag, 52 GRUR 496, 503 (1950) ; Lampert, Patente und Entkartellierung,
52 GRUR 1 (1950).
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nouncement as an expression of necessary and inherent limitations on
the application of any antitrust sanction to patents.' 6 The German
statute, however, claims support from decisions interpreting the Allied
Decartelization Ordinances,17 which decisions in turn were based on a
group of earlier opinions '8 defining the scope of patent licenses under
principles of "Treu and Glauben"-general Civil Code obligations
of good faith '9 -not under antitrust principles.
The appropriateness of a listing based on these principles is there-
fore open to challenge, although any criticism, to be justified, will have
to examine the entire "restrictions inherent in the patent monopoly"
concept.
II. INDUSTRIAL REALITIES UNDERLYING PATENT LICENSING
The usual economic justification for permitting this kind of re-
strictive licensing of patents is that on balance more competition is
opened up than is restrained by such licenses-the licensor who might
have monopolized the field is conferring a benefit when he allows any
competition.' An ancillary argument contends that often the
patentee's only means of realizing the fruits of his legal monopoly is
through restrictive licensing."
26 See Regulation 153, Dec. 24, 1962, 1962 J.O.C.E. 2922 (explanation of the above
categorizations).
1
7 Law No. 56, Mil. Gov. Gaz., Germany (United States Area of Control), issue
C (April 1, 1947), at 2; Regulation No. 78, 16 Mil. Gov. Gaz. (British Zone of
Control) (February 12, 1947), at 412. See in each case article V, § 9(c) (7), con-
demning "[the] devising of any arrangement, in connection with the exploitation of
patents or other similar exclusive privileges, so as to extend the monopoly or privilege
to matters not contained in the authorized grant." Cf. Bundesgerichtshof [hereinafter
cited as BGH] (I Zivilsenat), March 18, 1955, 17 Entscheidungen des Bundesge-
richtshofes in Zivilsachen [hereinafter cited as B.G.H.Z.] 41 (Ger. Fed. Rep.)
("Kokillengss"); Decision of BGH, June 18, 1957 (I Zivilsenat), in WuW/Ent-
scheidungen/BGH 200, 7 WuW 664 (1957). But cf. Bruchhausen, Zur kartellrecht-
lichen Zulfssigkeit von drtlichen Beschrdinkungen und Konkurrenzverboten in Lizenz-
vertrdigen, 65 GRUR 561 (1963). Compare Decision of Oberlandesgericht Hamburg,
Dec. 8, 1954 ("Baustofflizenz"), in WuW/Entscheidungen/OLG 84, 5 WuW 585
(1955). See generally LIEBERKNEcHT, PATENTE, LIzENZVERTRAGE UND VERBOT VON
WETTBEWERBSBESCHRXNKUNGEN 140-76 (1953).
18 See, e.g., BGH (I Senat), May 20, 1953 ("Konservendosen"), in WuW/Ent-
scheidungen/BGH 45, 3 WuW 558 (1953) ; Reichsgericht [hereinafter cited as RG],
June 27, 1913, 83 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen [hereinafter cited
as R.G.Z.] 9 (I Zivilsenat) (1914). Compare RG (I Zivilsenat), Nov. 5, 1930, 130
R.G.Z. 242 (1931).
19 Law of Aug. 18, 1896, § 157, Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch, [1896] Reichsgesetzblatt
195 (Ger.). See generally LlDEcKE & FISCHER, LIzENZVFRTRAGE 40-43 (1957) (later
edition not available).
20 See, e.g., Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845 (D.N.J. 1951),
aff'd, 207 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954).
21 See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). But cf.
VAUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEm 29-32 (1956).
There is a particular problem with combination patents, which can scarcely be
exploited without some restrictive licensing. See Bowman, Tying Arrangements and
the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 34-35 (1957). Compare Leitch Mfg. Co. v.
Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938), With Buxton, Inc. v. Julen, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 697
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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These arguments rest upon one assumption: there is "a" field
covered by "a" patent, and the scope of this patent is congruent with
the product that is to be competitively manufactured by the licensee.
Today this assumption is seldom valid. With admittedly many ex-
ceptions, patent coverage now generally means an undefined amount
of protection in many patents over a variety of processes and product
lines. A clutch of patents belonging to an enterprise in a modern field
like petrochemicals or electronics cannot efficiently be disentangled to
ascertain which of the exact processes (and to a lesser extent products
or apparatus) used or manufactured by competitors are covered by the
claims." Conversely, it is often impossible to ascertain, with any
reasonable expenditure of time and money, the exact extent to which
a given process is covered by a multitude of patent claims in various
hands." To some extent the prevalence of package licensing confirms
these remarks.2 4  The patents owned by an enterprise often have
nuisance value without affording real freedom of operation to that
enterprise. Even though one firm may have pursued a particular
approach to a commercial research and development problem and
obtained a relatively dominant position as to one of several solutions,
22 See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 332
(D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
23A good example is the struggle over patent protection in the polypropylene
field. See Spencer Gets Set To Market Polypropylene, Chemical & Engineering
News [hereinafter cited as C&EN], May 9, 1960, p. 28; Marketing Deals Blossom
in Polypropylene, C&EN, May 8, 1961, p. 21; Standard of California To Make
Polypropylene, C&EN, Jan. 1, 1962, p. 29; Hercules Gets Polypropylene Process
Patent, C&EN, Sept. 3, 1962, p. 25.
For a discussion of the tetracycline patent tangle, see Legal Action on Tetra-
cycline Piles Up, C&EN, July 20, 1964, p. 21. For the diffusion transfer and other
office copier patent problems, see The Revolution in Office Copying, C&EN, July 13,
1964, pp. 115, 121-22; C&EN, July 20, 1964, p. 84.
See generally Sanders, The Upgrading of Patented Inventions and Their Use
Here and Abroad II, 7 PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. OF RESEARCH &
EDUCATION 185 (1963) ; Sanders, Trends in Inventions: U.S. and Abroad, 7 PATENT,
TRADE ARK & COPYRIGHT J. OF RESEARCH & EDUCATION 85 (1963).
24 See, e.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827
(1950); International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 85 Sup. Ct. 701 (1965); Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
TRADE REG. REP. (1965 Trade Cas.) 71,355 (N.D. Ill. 1965). For other cases,
and a review of the antitrust implications of mandatory packaging, see Note, Manda-
tory Package Licensing: A New Patent Misuse, 44 VA. L. REv. 727 (1958) ; Note,
Package Patent Licenses and Public Policy, 21 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 61 (1952).
A related phenomenon is the "defined field license," whereby the licensee is
granted freedom to operate in a described technological field to the extent that any
of the licensor's patents would otherwise block it from so doing. For a discussion
of the technical aspects of such licenses, see Cooke, Defined Field Licenses, 39
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 635 (1957) ; of antitrust implications thereof, see Harmon, Anti-
trust and Misuse Implications of the Defined Field License, 45 J. PAT. OFF. Socy
463 (1963).
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it normally will have filed enough "blocking" applications to straddle
other solutions; and competing firms will have done the same. 5
Under these conditions the validity of the economic justification is
doubtful. Do mutual licenses, granting each party freedom from the
other's patent claims, but only for one product matrix for the first and
another for the second, or in one territory for the first and another
for the second, actually open up more competition than they restrain?
The question is further complicated by possible invalidity of patents
and the difficulty of determining, even where valid, the true limits
of their claimed coverage.26 Nonchallenge covenants, express or
implied by law, and bootstrap provisions concerning coverage can
create the facade of patent coverage where it may not exist.
2 7
2 5 "Besides its implications for the polyethylene business, the Du Pont-Phillips
settlement points up one of the newer facts of life in the chemical industry. It is
becoming increasingly hard for firms to get or keep 'technological monopolies' in
competitive product areas. Many observers believe that the days when a producer
could get long-term exclusive rights through patent coverage are gone." Du Pont
and Phillips Settle Polyethylene Suit, C&EN, Sept. 4, 1961, p. 25. See also the
pungent statements of Wyzanski, J., in United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. Industrial Shoe
Mach. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 826, 834-35 (D. Mass. 1963), judgment vacated, 335 F.2d
577, 580 n.3 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3251 (Jan. 26, 1965).
26 See Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 649,
656-61 (1947); Ammicx PATENT L. Ass'N BuLL. 37-38, for a brief statistical
resume of judicial declarations of invalidity.
Domestically, at least, the difficulties and entanglements caused by present
interference litigation also motivate such arrangements. For a description see Frost,
Some Possibilities and Limitations of Patent Interference "Reform," 7 PATENT,
TRADEmARK & COPYRIGHT J. or RsEARcH & EDUCATION 162 (1963).
27 See generally Kronstein, Arbitration Is Power, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 661 (1963);
note 90 infra. Several German cases pose serious problems as to the evasion of
public law standards by either arbitration arrangements, see BGH (Kartellsenat),
Dec. 5, 1963 ("Mikrophos"), in WuW/Entscheidungen/BGH 597, 602, 14 WuW
877, 882 (1964); private settlements, see BGH (I Zivilsenat), Feb. 15, 1955 ("rote
Herzwandvase"), 16 B.G.H.Z. 296 (1955); or simple agreements concerning scope,
see BGH (I Zivilsenat), Oct. 5, 1951 ("Tauchpumpe"), 3 B.G.H.Z. 193 (1951);
BGH (Kartellsenat), Jan. 10, 1964 ("Abbauhanmner"), in 19 BETRIEB-BERATER
1319 (1964). See also van den Heuvel, The Impact of the E.E.C.-Treaty (Treaty
of Rome) on Industrial Property With Regard to Antitrust Regulations, 9 SocrAAL-
EcONOMIscH- WETGEVING [hereinafter cited as Soc. Ec. WET.] 233, 237 (1961)
(Dutch example). In many industrial sectors where exploding research and devel-
opment costs of new technology strain the resources of the largest firms, patent
and know-how licensing is merely one of the aspects of the pooling of research and
its results. See del Marmol, Distribution Methods in Restraint of Competition Used
by Market Dominating Enterprises, in II CARTEL AND MONOPOLY IN MODERN LAW
475, 488 (1961). Joint research projects, automatic access to competitors' new devel-
opments, and joint ventures are commonplace today. Licenses of industrial tech-
nology thus have structural and integrative effect, an effect that so far has been
difficult to supervise under the grosser definitions implicit in monopolization and
antimerger statutes. See, e.g., Smith-Corona Marchant, Inc. v. American Photocopy
Equip. Co., 217 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Weinstein, The Application of Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act to Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, 5 PATENT,
TRADEmARK & COPYRIGHT J. OF RESEARCH & EDUCATION 328 (1962). But see
Sanders, Rossman & Harris, Patent Acquisition by Corporations, 3 PATENT, TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHT J. OF RESEARCH & EDUCATION 217 (1959); 1964 AMERICAN
PATENT L. ASS'N BULL. 47-52. This is another ground for doubting the appli-
cability to a modern economy of the somewhat naive economic justification of patent
license restrictions. For a more basic discussion of the themes suggested by the
text in this and the immediately preceding notes, see Kahn, Fundamental Deficiencies
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The situation is not much different in Western Europe. Fewer
patent applications are filed, and "flooding" with patents is not as
common as in the United States," due in part to the expense of keeping
issued patents in force. 9 This difference, however, is partly offset
by the wider reading often given to patent claims in Western European
countries and the practice of extending coverage to what in America
would not be claimable, whether as improvements or under the doc-
trine of equivalents." Under these circumstances the typical "pack-
age" may be smaller, but its units larger. Thus the problems in
Europe and America are to a great extent identical, although the in-
ternal boundaries of the patents are drawn differently.
of the American Patent Law, 30 Am. EcoN. REv. 475, 478; Kahn, The Role of
Patents, in COMPETITION CARTELS AND THERm REGULATON 308, 312-14 (Miller ed.
1962). For discussion of a related problem, see Bergstrom, Antitrust Immunity or
Exemption for Activities Involving Government Contracts---"Weapon Systems" and
"Team Bidding," 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 433 (1964).
2 See LIEBERKNECHT, PATENTE, LiZENZVERTR.GE UND Va.oT VON WETTBE-
WERBSBESCHERNKUNGEN 50-51 (1953) (German law). This self-restraint may also
be due to the ready availability, under § 15 of the German Patent Law, of a com-
pulsory license to the owner of an improvement patent that is useable only through
infringement of the basic patent. Patentgesetz, May 9, 1961, [1961] I BGB1 549
(Ger.); see REIMER, PATENTGESETZ UND GEBRAUcHS musTERGEsETz 248-50, 577-78
(2d ed. 1958).
The debate over the solution of these problems in a European patent framework
is described in Winkler, Schutzumnfang der Patente insbesondere in Hinsicht auf
das Abkommen des Europarats und des Europapatents, 66 GRUR 525 (1964).
29 For a comprehensive listing, see 1-2 MANUAL FOR THE HANDLING OF APPLICA-
TIONS FOR PATENTS, DESIGNS AND TRADE MARKS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (Octrooi-
burean los en Stigler ed. 1964).30 France: Art. 2, Loi sur les brevets d'invention, art. 2, July 5, 1844, [1831-
1848] Sirey Lois Annot~es (2d ser.) 810 (1875); see I CASALONGA, TRAIT-
TECHNIQUE ET PRATIQUE DES BREVETS D'INVENTIONS 187-93, 218 (1949); REYMOND,
LES SYSTIMES DE DAFINITIoN DES INVENTIONS EN DROIT DES BRF.VETs 21-30 (Disser-
tation Laussane 1959).
Germany: Patentgesetz § 6; see KN6PFLE, DIE BESTIMMUNG DES SCHUTZUMFANGS
DER PATENTE 25-39 (1958); Lindenmaier, Der Schutzumfang des Patents nach der
neueren Rechtsprechung, 46 GRUR 49 (1944).
The regime of improvements patents (patent d'addition, Zusatzpatent) in § 16
of the French and § 10 of the German patent laws is also relevant See Cour de
Lyon, April 2, 1962, in 97 ANNALES DE LA PROPRItTL INDUSTRIELLE, ARTISTIQUE ET
LiTT-RAin 37 (1963); Bundespatentgericht, Jan. 9, 1963, in [1963] BLATT r6-R
PATENT-, MUSTER- UND ZEICHENWESEN 157, annotated in 65 GRUR 366 (1963);
REIMER, PATENTGESETZ UND GEBRAUCHSMUSTERGESETZ 482-99 (2d ed. 1958). See
generally 1 TROLLER, IMMATERIALGUTERRECHT 187-94 (1959); 2 id. at 866-68. But see
Kellermann, Die gewerblichen Schutzrechte im Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrin-
kungen, 8 WUW 643, 653-54 (1958).
Recent developments may indicate a less generous attitude toward the scope
of patent coverage. See, e.g., BGH (I Zivilsenat), March 17, 1964, 17 NJW 1722
(1964). Compare Bonnet v. Bottieau, Cour De Cassation (Ch. Comm.), Decision
of June 12, 1961, in 96 ANNALES DE LA PROPRI§T- INDUSTRIELLE ARTiSTIQuE ET
LiTTLRAIE 1 (1962). See also Franzosi, Sul Contento del Diritto Di Brevetto, 11
RwsvITA Di DRnTTo INDUSTRIALE 1, 314, 369 (1962). For a comparison with Amer-
ican patent law generally, see Riesenfeld, The New United States Patent Act in the
Light of Comparative Law, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 291 (1954).
On the doctrine of equivalents, see Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Prods., 339 U.S. 605 (1950). A good recent elaboration is in Bullard Co. v. General
Elec. Co., 234 F. Supp. 995 (W.D. Va. 1964).
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III. DOCTRINE OF "INHERENT PATENT RIGHTS" ANALYZED
A. "Real" and "Obligatory" Rights
Identification of the logical base for the "inherent patent rights"
doctrine presupposes the availability of an exact definition of the con-
cept. We may begin therefore with an excellent description of the
doctrine, found in a discussion of article 4(2) of Regulation 17 by an
official of the Commission's Directorate General for Competition:
A license agreement which holds itself completely within the
limits of the patent law does not restrain competition. Only
such agreements are to be considered, therefore, which contain
restraints on competition going beyond the patent law, if
these competitive restraints are able to affect the commerce
between member states."
German writers in particular have refined this concept further "
by distinguishing between restrictions inhering in the res of the patent
(called "dinglich" or "patentrechtlich"), and restrictions imposed col-
laterally (called "obligatorisch" or "schuldrechtlich") .
4
31 Schumacher, upra note 1, at 481. See also ASSEmDLmE PARLEmENTAIE
EUROPtENNE, RAPPORT FAIT AU NOM DE LA COMMISSION DU MARCHA INTLRIEUR SUR
UN PREMIER PUGLEMENT D'APPLICATION DES ARTICLES 85 ET 86 DU TRAiTA DE LA
C.E.E. 25, para. 101 (Doc. 57, 1961).
3 2
1n the United States patent licenses can affect interstate commerce because
the patent monopoly, national in scope, is used in interstate commerce by definition.
In the EEC, at present, the patent is coextensive with state boundaries; in this sense,
licenses as such would not affect interstate commerce. Formally this might be so;
functionally, it is not. If a French firm holding a German patent requires its German
licensee to procure supplies only from it, potential interstate commerce with French
suppliers is as much restricted as is potential intrastate commerce with German sup-
pliers. Thus the relation between national patent rights and national trade has no
real bearing on the problem, quite apart from any change that may be occasioned
by a "European patent." See note 109 infra.
33 See, e.g., LfmEcrE & FiscnER, PATENTLIZENZVERTRXGE 379-84 (1957); REm--,
Patentgesets und Gebrauchsinustergesetz 349 (2d ed. 1958); REIMER, PATENTGESETZ
UND GEBRAUCHMUSERGESETZ 388 (1st ed. 1949). See also M6hring, Dekartellisierung
und Lizenzvertrag, 52 GRUR 496 (1950); Gleiss & Deringer, Patentmonopol und
Wettbewerbsfreheizt, 2 WuW 346 (1952). For a similar rationale by an Italian
commentator, see Sena, Brevetto e Monopolio, 12 RiviSTA Di DRIro INnDrSTRlaU
287, 300-07 (1963).
34 Strictly speaking, the concept "Dinglichkeit," "real-ness," in the German civil
classification structure is a subgroup of "Absolutheit," "absoluteness," and is limited
to tangible property. Intangible property such as patent rights falls only within the
larger class. See I voN TuHR, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL DES DEUTSCHEN BU-RGERLICHEN
REc TS 133-37, 146-48 (1910) ; 3 id. at 545-47. See also 1 ENNECCERUS & NIPPERDEY,
LEnRBUcH DES BORGERLICHEN RECHTS 2-7, 456, 461-65 (15th ed. 1959); Schmid,
Lber dingliche Gezwerberechte, 44 ARCHIV FOR DIE CIvImsTIScHE PRAxis [herein-
after cited as AcP] 1, 9-17, 182-83 (1861).
As to the same categorization in the French code structure (subject to the
"personalistic' distinction, see note 44 infra) see 3 PLANIOL & RiPERT, TRAiT
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One speaks of a restriction inherent in the patent law
(real) when the right of use is restricted as such; in other
words, is from the outset not complete but granted only with
a minus, so that a "part" thereof is lacking and the trans-
gression of the permitted limits makes the manner of use
impermissible (against the patent) . . . It is otherwise
with only contractual restrictions. There is no exception
of a sector of the right of use as such, but merely an "internal"
agreement between the parties which runs "along" concur-
rently with the actual license grant 35
The categorization obviously stresses the means for remedying
the licensee's transgressions of the license." A violation of the first
kind of restriction is an act of infringement, since it violates directly
the right of exclusion from dominion over property which is the
essence of the patent. A violation of the second kind of restriction is
not automatically an act of infringement, and the patented ware is
therefore a legitimate item of commerce. The licensor may sue for
breach of contract, perhaps even terminate the license, but before the
last step is taken, a third party may freely use or deal in these items.a7
The particular wording, emphasized by German and French
scholars of the law of industrial property and its licensing, indicates
an effort to graft upon patent licenses notions of "property" and "right"
derived from a more general private law context. "Dinglich" and
"obligatorisch" or "schuldrechtlich" are adjectives brought into
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIIL FRANcAIS 41-50, 56-57 (2d ed. 1952); 1 RIPERT &
BOULANGER, TRAITk DE DRorr CIVIL, 288-91 (1957) ; 2 id. at 780-85.
On the distinctions between patents, copyrights, etc. and normal intangible
property rights, see Kohler, Das Autorrecht, 18 JHERING JARBilcHER [hereinafter
cited as JEER. JAHRB.] 129, 199-202 (1880).
Compare statement of Holmes, in 1 HoLmms-PoL.ocx Ls srs 53 (1941) (quoted
in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 678 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting)) : "A patent is property carried to the highest degree of abstraction-a
right in rein to exclude, without a physical object or content."
35 LfDEcKE & FISCHER, PATENTLIZENZVERTRXGE 379 (1957).
36e generally RIGAUD, LE DROIT RiE 63-73 (1912). "[In] the field of pro-
cedure, the distinction between real rights and obligatory rights is manifested by
[the Romans] . . . in a manner so happy and consistent that it has passed as a body
into our modern law and has created a solid base on which the theory of real rights
and obligatory rights has been raised." Id. at 64.
This is manifested in the cases. See Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157
U.S. 659 (1895); Rubber Co. v. Goodyear Co., 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 788 (1869);
2 RoUBiER, LE DROIT DE LA PROPRIiT INDUSTRIELLE 269-72 (1954) (citing the
French jurisprudence).
37 See generally BENKARD, PATENTGESETZ, GEBRAUCHSmUSTERGESRTZ PATENTAIq-
WALTGESETZ 327-28 (4th ed. 1963).
38 See 1 ENNECCERUS & NIPPERDEY, oP. cit. supra note 34, at 428-76; 3 Planiol &
Ripert, supra note 34, at 41-53; von Gierke, Die Einheit des Rechts, 111 ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR DAS GESAmTE HANDELSRECHT 39, 62-70 (1947). For further citations to national
code treatment of these concepts, see Yiannopoulos, Book Review, 12 Am. J. Comr. L.
116 (1963).
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modem classification structures from Roman private law.39 They are
conceptual labels that distinguish respectively rights over a thing,
exercisable against the world, and rights to demand specified behavior
from particular persons because of the existence of certain voluntary
or involuntary relationships.
Real rights are those private rights which confer an im-
mediate power of control over a thing. . . . Real rights
belong to the category of "absolute" rights or rights avail-
able as against everybody because their effect is simply to
empower the person in whom they vest to act in a particular
manner. Any right that entitles a person to act himself-
e.g. a right of control based on . . . a patent right . . .-
is an absolute right, and absolute rights form, as such, the
antithesis to "obligatory" rights. . .. An obligatory right
only enables me to exercise a control over a thing through
the medium of another person's act . . .; a real right entitles
me to act myself, and thereby effects an immediate enlarge-
ment of my powers as against everybody.
4
0
Whether the origin of the classification stems from a listing of
claims for which an actio in rein was available 41 or from more dog-
matic and schematic efforts of logic,' whether an absolute right is
distinguished from an "obligatory" right by the former's direct relation
to a thing,43 or whether both can in fact exist only through their effect
on other persons, 44 is beyond the scope of this Article. In the modem
39 See SOHM, THE INSTITUTES 307-09, 327-37 (3d ed. Ledlie transl. 1907). Com-
pare 1 WINDSCHEID, LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHTS 116-73 (9th ed. 1906). For
a critique of this development (aimed at an earlier draft of the German Civil Code),
see GIERYE, DER ENTWURF EINEs BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHS UND DAS DEUTSCHE
RECHT 40-48 (1889).
The Germanic private law, however, also knew similar classifications and has
by some been credited with at least partial parentage of the present system. See
HUEBNER, HISTORY OF GERMANIC PRIvATE LAW 162-64 (Philbrick transl. 1918). See
also GERBER, SYSTEM DES DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 137-52 (15th ed. 1886).
40 SOHM, op. cit. supra note 39, at 307-09, 308 n.1.
4 1 FUCHS, DAS WESEN DER DINGLICHKEIT 14-17 (1889) ; THIBAUT, SYSTEM DES
PANDEKTEN-RECHTS 46-48 (1823). See the general review of this position in Oert-
mann, Der Begriff der Dinglichkeit, 31 JHER. JAHRB. 415 (1892), which the author
modified in Zur Struktur der subjektiven Privatrechte, 3 AcP 129 (1925).
4 2 See, e.g., 1 ENNECCERUS & NiPPERBEY, op. cit. Mipra note 34, at 450-51. For
citations see Raiser, Book Review, 18 JURISTENZEITUNG 422 (1963).
43 See, e.g., 1 ENNECCERUS & NIPPERDEY, op. cit. supra note 34, at 450-51; cf.
LEHMANN, ALLGEmEiNER TIm DES BMIRGERLiCHEN GESETZBUCHES 80 (12th ed. 1960).
44 See 1 KOHLER, LEHRBUCH DES BUjRGERLICHEN REcHTS 178-79 (1906) ; Kohler,
Das Autorrecht, 18 JHER. JAHRB. 129, 186-87 (1880).
This position resembles the "personalistic" view of § 544 of the French Civil
Code. CODE Civi. art. 544 (Fr. 63d ed. Dalloz 1964). See generally 1 PLANIO,
THE CiviL LAw pt. 2, at 282-83 (La. State Law Institute transl. 1959); note 34
supra. The Italian doctrine is less clear. See AScARELLi, TEORIA DELLA CONCOR-
RENZA E DEl BENI IMMATERIALI 510-12 (2d ed. 1957); Barbero, I "Beni Imma-
teriali" Come Oggetto Di Diritto, 11 RViSTA Di DnRirro INDUSTRiALE 297 (1962).
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context the distinction is used to determine the procedure by which
a patentee undoes violations of the agreement, and substantively
whether any remedy is available even against third parties which deal
with the transgressing licensee. The consequences, however, of attach-
ing to patent licenses the context customarily ascribed to "Dinglichkeit"
are unfortunate, because a misleading element is thus introduced among
the criteria for judging these patent licenses. At present, in the emerg-
ing law of the European Economic Community, for example, this
concept of "inherent rights," as historically developed, is being given
an unnecessary substantive content even as it is procedurally
misunderstood.
Substantively, if the grant of a territorially restricted license, for
example, is deemed to be legitimate conduct by the parties thereto, then
perhaps a violation of the restriction should permit redress in the
manner an "absolute right" of the patentee would be normally re-
dressed: by an action for infringement. This conclusion should not
be turned around and given a life of its own such to compel conse-
quences the legal order may wish to prevent.45  The existence of a
right to redress a breach of a territorial restriction by an infringement
action46 should not preclude judging a contract purporting to convey
such a restricted right to be a contract in restraint of trade. How
to judge such a restraint in fact, or how to meet the objection that
any grant of freedom to use a patent, even on conditions, is a freeing
of trade from the legal monopoly permitted the patentee, is a separate
matter. The issue now is whether the normal categorization of license
restrictions has normative force.
Procedurally, too, misconceptions arise from the "plus-or-minus"
concept of patent licensing, in the main because the "Dinglichkeit" or
"droit r6el" categorization historically involved the rights of an owner
of a thing. 7 The categorization by its very nature applies with
awkwardness and difficulty to the violation of limitations placed upon
the manufacture, use, or sale of a product, process, or apparatus under
a grant of immunity.' A grant of less than the whole immunity from
a patent, if not honored, allows the patentee to assert a claim of
infringement of his remaining patent rights against the whole world.
45 See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942). Compare
LIEBERKNECET, op. cit. supra note 28, at 108-12.
46 See LMiDEcKE & FisciaER, PATENTLIZENVERTRAGE, 390 (1957).
47This is not strictly accurate. Intangible property rights are classified as
"absolute" rights, as are the more common "real" rights in tangible property. The
former, of course, can be described in negative terms of exclusion (as, to a lesser
extent, can the latter). See Kohler, Das Autorrecht, 18 JHER. JAHRB. 129 (1880).
Compare the somewhat cryptic characterization of the license in the earlier version
of OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDEAL ANTITRUST LAWS 690 (1948).
48 But cf. WESTERMANN, SACHENRECHT 8 (4th ed. 1960).
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These nontransferred remainders, of course, are what is "inherent" in
the patent as a result of this chain of logic. 49 They must be, for other-
wise what element of ownership was retained by the patentee that it
can exercise as "an absolute right" through the medium of an infringe-
ment action! r1 If the limited utility of these conceptions is ap-
preciated, the need to apply the concept "inherent in the patent monop-
oly" as a logical barrier to the application of antitrust law disappears;
and so does any notion that a restriction not going beyond the patent,
because it "inheres" in the monopoly, cannot by its very nature be a
restraint on competition. 51
B. Judicial Utilization of the Concept
The barrenness of the orthodox concept is illustrated by earlier
cases that had to resolve conflicting policies of private law. 2 An
outstanding example is the now discredited case of Henry v. A. B.
Dick Co. 53  The company sold a patented mimeograph machine with
a marked (and thus public) restriction that "it may be used only with
the stencil paper, ink and other supplies made by A. B. Dick," all of
them unpatented. The license restriction was conceded to be a con-
tract breached by the machine owner when she purchased supplies
from the defendants (at a time when tie-in clauses were valid). Since
the company could gain little from pursuing the private purchasers,
it sued defendants under the patent law, charging them with aiding
and abetting the machine owner's infringement. The Supreme
Court, in allowing the action, stated:
The property right to a patented machine may pass to a
purchaser with no right of use, or with only the right to use
in a specified way, or at a specified place, or for a specified
purpose. The unlimited right of exclusive use which is
possessed by and guaranteed to the patentee will be granted
if the sale is unconditional. But if the right of use be con-
fined by specific restriction, the use not permitted is neces-
sarily reserved to the patentee. If that reserved control of
49 Compare the grantor's rights following the grant of a fee simple determinable
as against those following the grant of a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent.
50 Compare OPPENHEIM, op. cit. .spra note 47, at 690.
61.As the discussion below makes clear, this conclusion does not justify the fur-
ther conclusion, drawn by the TNEC's Final Report, that all such "inherent" restric-
tions should be forbidden. SEN. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 36269 (1941).
52See Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed.
288 (6th Cir. 1896). See also Commercial Acetylene Co. v. Widrig, 190 Fed. 201
(E.D. Mich. 1910); Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O'Brien, 93 Fed. 200 (D. Mass.
1898). Compare Reichsgericht (I Zivilsenat), March 26, 1902, 51 R.G.Z. 139
(C-er.); 1 REIMER, PATENTGESETZ UNI) GESETZ BFTREFFEND DEN SCHUTZ VON
GERAUcnsmusmaaN 390 (1949) (earlier edition).
53 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
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use of the machine be violated, the patent is thereby invaded.
This right to sever ownership and use is deducible from the
nature of a patent monopoly and is recognized in the cases."'
In dissent Mr. Chief Justice White clearly distinguished between
the logical categorization of these restrictions and the policy of granting
to a patentee rights against third parties dealing with his licensees:
[A] s the result of a case decided some years ago by one of
the Circuit Courts of Appeals,', which has been followed by
cases in other Circuit Courts of Appeals " . . . what prior
to the first of those decisions on a sale of a patented article
was designated a condition of sale, governed by the general
principles of law, has come in practice to be denominated a
license restriction, thus, by the change of form, under the
doctrine announced in the cases referred to, bringing the
matters covered by the restriction within the exclusive sway
of the patent law.57
But that is not all. Since the Court chose to allow a patentee to
pursue directly, as infringers, third parties dealing with a licensee who
had breached a collateral restriction, it would follow a fortiori that
the knowing or innocent status of the licensee-infringer would be
irrelevant. If the right inherent in the patent to prevent others from
producing the patented item is exercisable against the world, including
infringing licensees, it should not be qualified by any concept of bona
fides.- Even Henry v. A. B. Dick Co. did not proceed this far, but
instead indicated that the directly infringing licensee, let alone the
contributory infringer, could only be reached because of the public
notice of the restriction given by means of the marking on the ma-
chine."9 This example should suffice to show that there always have
541d. at 24-25.
55 The mentioned case is not named, but it is apparently Heaton-Peninsular
Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).
56 Apparently Cortelyou v. Charles E. Johnson & Co., 145 Fed. 933 (2d Cir.
1906). See also cases cited in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 38 n.1 (1912).
5 7 Id. at 56.
58 See, e.g., 1 REIMER, op. cit. .spra note 52, at 391 (citing especially RAscHa,
DER LIZENzVERTEAG IN RECHTSV.RGLEICIENDER DARSTL UNG 88 (1933)). The same
is generally true in the United States as to infringement situations uncomplicated
by license problems-letters patent are public records, Boyden v. Burke, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 575 (1852), of whose contents all are bound to take notice.
591d. at 38 n.1 and cases there cited (especially Cortelyou v. Charles E. Johnson
& Co., 145 Fed. 933 (2d Cir. 1906)).
A similar rule may apply in some other countries, depending upon statutory
requirements as to the infringer's knowledge of the existence of the complainant's
patent. See, e.g., van den Heuvel, supra note 27, at 237. The same rule now ob-
tains in the United States by statute if the infringed products are not marked. 66
Stat. 813 (1954), 35 U.S.C. § 287 (1958).




been policy limits to the rigorous application of these formal doctrines.
The doctrines may be useful, as generalizations from experience, to
courts and legal advisors in the exercise of their casuistic function;
they are not barriers to a policy-dictated expansion or contraction of
remedies.'
There is nothing new in remarking on the senselessness of letting
these extraneous private law concepts guide or limit the use of anti-
trust policies." The priority and overriding nature of the latter were
thrashed out when freedom of contract was the issue ' and remained
preeminent when the sanctity of private property was argued.6 ' Even
modern commentators, however, are often caught in the conceptual
snare of the inherent patent right when they frame their discussions,
in more sophisticated terms, around the "legitimate reward" the
patentee may reap from its patent and the conduct appropriate to reap-
ing that reward. Consider, for example, the following typical
discussion:
In judging the acceptability of license restrictions we
must proceed from the starting point that competition is for
the first time begun by the grant of a license. The licensor
can open it without restrictions, but he can also open it with
restrictions; compared with the situation before the grant of
the license this is still a plus. There can be no talk of a re-
straint on competition. The patent owner in no way expands
his monopoly thereby. In judging these license conditions
it cannot be material whether the license is real or obligatory,
whether one considers the restrictions as granting to the
60 The law of things [Sachenrecht] is no longer an autonomous legal sphere
to itself, nor does the law make the number of real rights a group closed by
conceptual necessity; instead, it is only the requirements of political economy
and the considerations of legal policy that can decide whether and to what
extent a right should be protected as a real, i.e., absolute, one.
FUCHS, op. cit. supra note 41, at 17. For a similar view by one who otherwise favors
an entirely different conceptual approach as to the nature of "Dinglichkeit", see
Raiser, Book Review, 18 JURISTENZEITUNG 422 (1963).
01 See Koch, The European Economic Community, 6 PATENT, TRADEMEARK &
COPYRIGHT J. OF RESEARCH & EDUCATION 97, 102 (1962) (separate conference issue).
In more general terms, see Broda, Die Mitarbeit Osterreichs an der Europaischen
Rechtsvereinheitlichung, 4 ZFATscHmrr FftI RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 193, 199 (1964).
62 United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276-77 (1942). Even Mr.
Justice Holmes, dissenting in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,
243 U.S. 502 (1917), with his illusory epigram, "Generally speaking the measure of
a condition is the consequence of a breach, and if that consequence is one that the
owner may impose unconditionally, he may impose it conditionally upon a certain
event," id. at 519, added, "I leave on one side . . . what I might think . . . if the
question were upon the effect of a combination of patents such as to be contrary to
the policy that I am bound to accept from the Congress of the United States," id. at
521. See also Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
63 Cf. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Patterson v. Kentucky, 97
U.S. 501 (1878). For an analogous problem in the accommodation of property rights
to taxation policies, see Mutze, Rechtliches Oder Wirtschaftliches Eigentum?, 16
NJW 513 (1963). See also Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) ; Wissner v. Wissner,
338 U.S. 655 (1950).
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licensee from the first only a restricted right or whether he
first obtains an unrestricted right, this is, however, uno actu
again restricted. The economic significance must be decisive.
A glance at the American decisions cited above shows that
there too restrictions concerned with the exploitation of the
protected right are not forbidden, as long as they remain
within the statutory patent monopoly. It is only a question
of drawing the boundaries of this statutory monopoly."
Essentially, this comment substitutes the "plus" of new commerce
for the older, more arid arguments about the "plus" versus "minus"
definition of inherent restraints 5 Is this not, however, merely refin-
ing the unrealistic early conceptual formulation by a further step? The
"starting point" in the quoted passage assumes what in fact is the
very matter to be analyzed: that competition is begun by the license
grant. This conclusion renders relatively insignificant the writer's
later opinion that "the difference between real and obligatory license
restrictions is valueless." 6 This very conclusion already characterized
most of the early American decisions, culminating perhaps in United
States v. General Elec. Co." It is a conclusion found, along with the
same two-step reasoning process, even in some pre-antitrust decisions
in Germany.6' It no more resolves the problem than do the earlier
formulations. From our standpoint all of these formulations are
circular and do not go to define the reach of the antitrust laws to
patent licenses.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PATENT RIGHTS
A. Reasons for Application
The factors precluding the definition of the antitrust laws' scope
by these formulations divide into two broad groups, reasons having to
do with the persons and those concerning the patents involved.
First, even on the assumption that "the" patent exists in all its
surface simplicity, there is seldom an identity of the relevant field of
the patent and the relevant field, occupied by actual enterprises, in
which its restrictive exploitation will be felt. This lack of congruence
64 LIEBERXNECHT, op. cit. supra note 28, at 167.
65 Id. at 118.
661d. at 169. For a similar extensive, articulate yet unsatisfactory description,
see GfiNTHER, op. cit. supra note 15, at 63-69; MAGEN, LZENZVERTRAG TJND ARTEL.-
RECUT 80-82 (1963).
67272 U.S. 476 (1926). See the similar statements made even by Stedman, The
U.S. Patent System and Its Current Problems, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 450, 466 (1964).
e8 See, e.g., Reichsgericht (I Zivilsenat), June 27. 1913, 83 R.G.Z. 9, 14 (Ger.).
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is analytically important. 9 The restrictive licensing of a patent can
inhibit more competition than it opens up whenever the product,
process, or apparatus covered by its claims is only a part of the product,
process, or apparatus affected by the particular licensee's operations
under the license. The "relevant market" affected by the limited
license is in that case broader than the "market" covered by the patent
claims.
An example: two national competitors manufacture loudspeakers.
One obtains patent coverage on an amplifier component and grants the
other an exclusive license to manufacture the claimed product, terri-
torially limited to one-half the country, or perhaps limited to industrial
end customers. The licensee then shifts from its former loudspeaker
to one embodying the new component and limits its commercial activi-
ties to half the country or to industrial applications. The licensor acts
likewise as to its reserved area or product. Perhaps it is begging the
question to assume away a possible underlying agreement to divide
markets. Nevertheless, assuming this away for the moment and
turning solely to the "inherent restriction" problem, has "competition"
between these parties-in the loudspeaker market-been opened up or
throttled by the agreement? If the new patent represents such an
advance that its embodiment in a loudspeaker would sweep all loud-
speaker competition before it, thus converting the loudspeaker market
into a legal monopoly for the patentee, then, perhaps, a restrictive
license assures more competition in that broader market than would
exist without it.7' Otherwise, however, the territorially restricted
license has affected a market far broader than that claimed by the
patent. In some cases even congruence between patent claim and
product market may not alone preclude this result. If the patentee was
a hitherto negligible factor in loudspeaker competition and now licenses
major competitors, the competition inhibited by the latter's territory
or product division would likely be more significant than that con-
69 See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) ; Note,
Improperly Procured Patents: FTC Jurisdiction and Remedial Power, 77 HAV. L.
REv. 1505 (1964). See also Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10 n.8
(1958).
70 For example, the more easily attacked cross-license by both parties, with terri-
torial restrictions, is treated as a horizontal conspiracy in German law because of
this "underlying agreement" factor. OLG Hamburg, ("Baustofflizenz"), Dec. 8, 1954,
in WuW/Entscheidungen/OLG 84, 5 WuW 585 (1955) (decided under the decarteliza-
tion ordinance) ; BERICHET DES BUNDESKARTELLAMTES 0BER SEINE TXTIGKEIT IM JAE
1958 [hereinafter cited as BKARTA REP. with year] 76 (so stating as to exclusive
cross-licenses); LuY.Es, DER KARTELLVERTRAG 308 (1959); BAUMBAcH-HEFERMEHL,
WETTBEWERBS UND WARENZEICHENRECHT 1365 (8th ed. 1960); cf. BKARTA REP.
1959, at 153.
7 1 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
1965]
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ceivably resulting from the patentee's newly invigorated and, by the
patent claims, fully supportable entry into the loudspeaker market.72
In these examples the licensee may be acting in fear of the com-
petitive effect of the patentee's new position; or it may be acting out
of an aggrandizing though unilateral motive, bargaining for this split
in patent exclusivity in the expectation of creating a market division.
In either event an objective evaluation of "new competition"! is neces-
sary; in other words an evaluation made or subject to review by anti-
trust enforcement agencies. This discussion applies, though perhaps
to a lesser degree, to all situations where product competition is ended,
shifted, or modified as the result of a patent license. Even if the patent
claims generally cover an improved product that is roughly congruent
with the "relevant competitive market," the question of whether com-
petition in that market has been increased or hampered is no less com-
plex, and resolvable only by the same analysis.73
The second basic reason for questioning the assumption that a
license by definition opens up new competition arises from the economic
realities described in part II of this Article. 4 Until the technical
aspects of the licensed patents-in particular their validity and scope-
are correctly ascertained, this assumption should be withheld. Un-
fortunately, there is no model available against which to test the form
of the license for such questionable incidents; a case-by-case approach
to these limited licenses is the only feasible way of discovering the
existence of trade restrictive situations.75
Thus any a priori abstract listing of provisions appropriate to
achieve the licensor's "legitimate" rewards via the exploitation of its
patents is nothing more than a hindrance to legitimate analysis. The
maximizing of financial rewards is irrelevant to the application of anti-
72 Compare the (easier) problems raised by multiple identical licenses from an
autonomous or jointly-owned patent holding company, see, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931), or from the research company that supports itself
through the licensing of its own inventions, see, e.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. Indus-
trial Shoe Mach. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 826, 831-32 (D. Mass. 1963), judgment vacated,
335 F2d 577 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3251 (Jan. 26, 1965).
73 As in the case of Sherman Act conspiracies created in dealership situations,
the "agreement" needed for the conspiracy is the license itself. The nonidentical
motivation of the parties in entering the agreement does not negate the requisite intent,
nor, therefore, the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S.
265 (1942). See also Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) ; United States
v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
74 See pp. 637-40 supra.
75 In the EEC context, this means that eventually the nonnotifiable status of
such license arrangements, under article 4(2) of Regulation 17, should probably be
terminated. In any event the nonnotification system is designed to be a temporary
administrative expedient only. See note 9 supra.
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trust principles.76 Consensual restraints of preexisting or potential
trade should be decisive." If a license agreement can achieve that
result, it should at least be subject to review for its anticompetitive
possibilities. 78 A test of the patent's validity and scope is a necessary
condition for establishing the product or commerce area over which
the patent in fact can exercise dominion. The very items that need
be found to establish the validity of the enforcement agencies' exercise
of jurisdiction over these licenses will also be prime evidence of re-
strictive arrangements.7
9
B. Jurisdictional Basis for Application
Since an antitrust sanction can be imposed because of the de-
scribed two-fold disparity between the claimed justification and its
real status, it now becomes relevant to sketch the procedures for
investigating these disparities. It might first be argued that any
license suffering from these disparities, themselves the jurisdictional
basis for introducing antitrust sanctions, may be attacked--even one
that does no more than authorize the licensee to manufacture free of an
infringement threat and contains no other provisions whatsoever.
Indeed, some European commentators who favor strong antitrust
measures have already asserted, as a variant of this position, that the
promise to pay a royalty exhausts the reciprocal promise not to sue
for infringement entailed in any license, and that all other contractual
statements, even such as "a license for less than the normal patent dura-
76 See, e.g., Cutter Lab., Inc. v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp., 179 F.2d 80 (9th Cir.
1949) (discussion of grant back provisions). The use of "reasonable reward" as a
legitimating factor for restricted licenses stems from the case of United States v.
General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926) (in other respects now discredited).
See also pp. 647-48 supra.
77 Compare the burden of proof of "conspiracy" required in Baker-Cammack
Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Davis Co., 181 F.2d 550 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 834
(1950) (pooling of patents).
78 Compare the more stringent view of Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in General
Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 128, 132-33 (1938),
though here there was involved only the rights of a purchaser of a product made by
a licensee outside the use-field of its license.
79 This approach, central to our discussion, would avoid the question-begging that
still characterizes the argument, if not the result, in many decisions in this field. A
good example is the treatment of a license restricted to one field of use in the just
mentioned case of General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., supra note
78, at 126-27. The court uses pre-Sherman Act cases as authority for finding this
kind of restricted license "legal." That any private contract is at first glance "legal"
hardly needs citation; the old cases cited thereto, and the old arguments, involve the
procedural problems of pursuing violations of such agreements. Then the 1926 GE
dogma allowing license conditions if "reasonably within the reward" is used, and the
condition under discussion sanctioned because it is of that character. Ibid. But it
is then disclosed to be of that character because it is an old practice, the legality of
which has never been questioned-again citing the pre-Sherman Act cases! See
Note, Patent Use Restrictions, 75 HARv. L. REv. 602, 608-09 (1962).
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tion," are separately reviewable, as agreements, for possible antitrust
violations."0
In my opinion this is an unnecessarily broad approach. It is un-
justifiable not because--at least in the variant European version-it
ignores the need for showing such disparities, for in fact this view
probably requires a test of the disparities in deciding whether a
violation exists. It is unjustifiable, in either version, because it chal-
lenges too many patent licenses, forgetting why they would be
challenged if they were naked restraints unencumbered by their patent
covering. In other words this view assumes jurisdictional warrant for
testing for antitrust violations without giving any consideration to the
nature of the license.
As noted, this seems too loose an approach. There should be an
independent jurisdictional basis for an antitrust review, a review in-
volving the search for the two-fold disparity already mentioned. This
jurisdictional basis exists if the license agreement, absent patent
justification, fits the formal definitions courts have derived from the
Sherman Act (or definitions inferable from article 85 of the Rome
Treaty, to continue the comparison):
(1) A horizontal agreement between present or potential
competitors to divide market areas is a contractual re-
straint of trade and as such a per se violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act.s  A patent license limiting the
licensee to a certain area would be the analogous
contract in the "inherent restraint" setting.
(2) A horizontal agreement between present or potential
competitors to divide markets by products or customers
is a contractual restraint of trade and as such a per se
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.8 2  A patent
license limiting the licensee to a certain product or end
customer group within the purported patent claims
would be the analogous contract in the "inherent re-
straint" setting.
(3) A horizontal agreement between present or potential
competitors to control output is a contractual restraint
of trade and as such a per se violation of section 1 of the
80 Suggestions that such positions are being argued can be gleaned from the
recently published note of VerLoren van Themaat, Die Bedeutung von Art. 36 fir
die Kartellrechtliche Beurteilung von Patentlizensvertrdgen itach Art. 85 des EWG-
Vertrages, [1964] GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT-AUSLANDS
UND INTERNATIONALES TEn. [hereinafter cited as GRUR-AIT] 21, and from Koch,
supra note 61, at 97-102.
SlAddyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
82 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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Sherman Act.3 A patent license limiting the licensee
to an output quota would be the analogous contract in
the "inherent restraint" setting."s
The same restrictions, particularly the first two, can be found in
the use of vertical arrangements as carriers for a manufacturer's
attempt to set up a territorially or customer-limited distribution
system. 5 These, of course, do not sound in promissory or prohibitory
restrictive terms; like licenses for less than the patent's duration, they
are simply phrased as conveying less than the whole power available
under the patent. Nevertheless, since if "translated" they would read
as familiar horizontal or vertical restrictive agreements, they establish
the jurisdictional basis for antitrust review for the two types of dis-
parities already defined.8 6  These, if we may now speak of them as
two lines of inquiry, are factual-neither can be pursued by looking
alone to the form of the license.
C. Nature of the Inquiry Into the Patent
The inquiry into the "patent" is difficult to describe, as it im-
pinges upon the duties and expertise of the patent office and may even
be blocked to some degree by present national rules. These barriers
will be explored as the scope of the inquiry is detailed.
83 American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
84 The other two "inherent restrictions," limitations to less than the full duration
of the patent and to less than all three types of exclusivity (manufacture, use, and
sale) granted by each letter patent, seem to me to be generally innocuous from an
antitrust point of view. It is possible, of course, that the latter could be the vehicle
for converting a former or potential competitor into a supplier or agent of the licensor.
See United States v. Masonite, 316 U.S. 265 (1942). In that event the analysis and
argument of this paper could apply to permit scrutiny of that provision as well, if
these provisions, without their patent covering, could be characterized as Sherman
Act violations. The latter probably could be; I am not sure that the same is true
of the former. In a "vertical" license agreement, as between manufacturer and dis-
tributor, the former provision would again be more difficult to place in the Clayton
Act context.
85 See, e.g., Switzer Bros. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961) ; F. C. Russell
Co. v. Consumers Insulation Co., 226 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1955). Compare 78 REV.
INT'LE DR LA CONCURRENCE 16 (1963).
The right, under private and patent law principles, to split the rights to make,
to use, or to sell has been accepted since Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453
(1873) (dictum).
'88Cmp United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
For a reviewv of the possible disposition of related problems arising under the cover
of a trademark license, see Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws it; Trade-
miark Licen.ing, 71 YAT L.J. 1171, 1197-204 (1963) (reprinted 53 TADEmAix~ REP.
1130 (1963)); JANSKY, WARENZEICHENLIZENZVERTPAG (Dissertation K6In 1964). A
major portion of the Commission's first "big case" involves territorial divisions
through trademark licensing. Decision of Sept. 23, 1964 ("Grundig-Consten"), 1964
J.O.C.E. 2545, 2547-48.
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Three types of questions seem important:
(1) Did the parties to the license by previous arrangement
manipulate the issuance of the "patent" to a party that
might not otherwise have received it? 7
(2) Did the parties manipulate the issuance of the "patent"
so that it claims greater coverage, or greater validity,
than would be the case had the patent office proceedings
been free of such manipulative action? 1
(3) Did the parties by agreement preclude themselves from
challenging the scope or the validity of the "patent"
when they (other than the patentee) would be the logical
and perhaps the only ones to perform that adversary
function? "
The first two problems have just been raised in a vivid manner by
the Federal Trade Commission's decision in the American Cyanamid
Co. case 9 and by the passage of the recent statute on undisclosed inter-
ference arrangements, which "voids" patents issued as a result of such
agreements. 9' Both the decision and the statute indicate that these
practices can operate to create misleading or nonexistent patent cover-
age, which in turn can be used to carry license limitations that naked
would have no antitrust immunity. Both also confirmed the reason-
ableness of allowing the investigation of these somewhat technical
issues by the antitrust enforcement agency-not in rivalry with the
87American Cyanamid Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1116527 (FTC Aug. 8, 1963), final
order entered, TRADE REG. REP. f 16699 (FTC Dec. 17, 1963). Appeals have been
docketed in the Sixth Circuit. See Note, Improperly Procured Patents: FTC Juris-
diction and Remedial Power, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1505, 1507 n.7 (1964). For further
excellent discussions of the case, see Barnes, Recent Patent-Antitrust Developments,
1964 AmmtcAN PATENT L. Ass'N BULL. 142; Note, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 601 (1964).
ssAmerican Cyanamid Co., supra note 87.
89 United States v. Carter Prods., Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 1170547 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)
(consent decree).
9 0 
TRADE REG. REP. 1 16527 (FTC Aug. 8, 1963), final order entered, TRADE RaG.
REP. 1f 16699 (FTC Dec. 17, 1963). Appeals have been docketed. See note 87 supra.
See also United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
' 35 U.S.C. § 135 (Supp. IV, 1963) ; see Buxbaum, Patent Licensing: A Case
Study on Antitrust Regulation Within the European Economic Community, 9 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 101, 139-40 n.124 (1964).
On the reasons for this legislation and the difficulties of preventing the manipulation
mentioned in the text, see Hearings on H.R. 11015 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); Hearings on H.R.
12513 Before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate
Conmittee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). See generally 8 PATENT,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. O RESEARcH & EDUCATION 85-94 (Conference Number
1964) ; Davis, Patent Licensing and the Anti-Trust Laws: Some Recent Develop-
ments, 46 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 12, 32 (1964).
On the implications of United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., supra note 90, for this
collusive settlement problem, see the discussion by Timberg in 1964 AmERIcAN PATENT
L. Ass'N BULL. 59. See also Kronstein, Arbitration Is Power, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 661
(1963) ; Kronstein, Business Arbitration--Instrument of Private Government, 54
YALE L.J. 36 (1944).
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patent office's role or decision,92 but because the latter's decision may
have been influenced and even made a vain thing by these activities.93
The third problem, concerning peripheral nonchallenge agree-
ments 9 4 or bootstrap provisions as to coverage,"5 is another matter.
These clauses are cousin to the collusive settlement of interferences,
but can only be uncovered when the enforcement agency makes its own
check of the field definition in the license, vis-A-vis the patent claims.'
In any technologically complex area this is an almost hopeless task,
whether it be for the agency to prove this disparity or for the re-
spondent to establish full congruence between the two relevant
definitions.9"
92Compare von Kbhler, Behrdenkonkurrenz im Kartellrecht, 79 DEUTSCHES
VERWALTUNGSBLATT 214, 215 (1964), who argues that the German Federal Cartel
Office should not become a "technical supervisory agency" in this field. See also
the discussion of EEC reactions to the American Cyanamid decision by Dixon, in
8 PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. OF RESEARCH & EDUCATION 112, 114 (Con-
ference Number 1964).
93sCullen & Vickers, Fraud in the Procurement of a Patent, 49 GEo. WAsH. L.
REv. 110 (1960). See the Commission's evaluation of the deception practiced upon
the patent examiner in American Cyanamid Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1 16527, at 21406
(FTC Aug. 8, 1963). See also United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174
(1963). Compare P & D Sales & Mfg. Co. v. Winter, 334 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1964),
reversing 222 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
For general impression of the motivations leading to settlements and licenses,
see Hearings on H.R. 11015, supra note 91; Hearings on H.R. 12513, supra note 91;
Hearings on S. Res. 2303 and 2491 Before the Senate Committee on Patents, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 69, 94, 669, 681, 698, 756, 1141, 1270, 3305 (1942) (Bone Hearings).
Compare BGH, Decision of Oct. 5, 1951 (I Zivilsenat), 3 B.G.H.Z. 193.
94 It is important to recall that under varying national standards there may be
an estoppel to challenge validity by operation of law following the acceptance of license
status. United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S. 310 (1905). As to the federal
or local nature of this rule, see Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); Sola
Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942). See also Lage v. Caldwell
Mfg. Co., 221 F. Supp. 802, 807 (D. Neb. 1963) ; JFD Electronics Corp. v. Channel
Master Corp., 229 F. Supp. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Concerning this rule of law, see
the discussion of German jurisprudence in LODECKE & FIScHER, LIZENZVERTRXGE 162-68
(1957). Concerning more specific contractual provisions not to challenge, and their
treatment under German law, see PEEVz, DIE NiCHTANGRi SELAUSsEL IN LIZENZVER-
TRAGEN (Dissertation G6ttingen 1961). While German law and comment on this
topic is the most extensive and intensive in the EEC, it should be noted that the
German Cartel Law authorizes such provisions-§ 20(2) (4)-and in its very specificity
may not necessarily be a model for the Commission.
9 5 Again on the German law hereon, see L-ODECKE & FISCHER, op. cit. supra
note 94, at 724-25; PEEVz, op. cit. mpra note 94, at 74-77. For a discussion of French
law, see 2 RouBIER, LE Daorr DE LA PRoPRi±TA INDUSTRIELLE 280-81 (1954).
96 It seems, unfortunately, that the Commission is agreeing to the omission of
field definitions from the license agreements being submitted, presumably because of
the argument that these are business confidences which are to be kept inviolate
pursuant to article 20 of Regulation 17. See note 143 infra.
97As a result, if the burden were left with the respondents, most of these license
agreements would be open to challenge, at least from the jurisdictional point of view.
That this should not foreclose upholding their validity in any given case, see pp.
665-66 infra.
For a good exposition of the more or less traditional view against such a juris-
dictional construction as is here broached, see Oppenheim, Patents and Antitrust:
Peaceful Coexistence?, 54 Mica. L. REv. 199 (1955).
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The specific decisional barriers in the United States against the
initiation of such attacks by the enforcement agencies, especially the
Department of Justice, are not serious.' It is true that the right of
the Government to sue to annul a patent for fraud is limited.9  The
old Bell Telephone cases 10o not only suggest a doctrine of exclusive
jurisdiction in the Patent Office-which has little power to act once
the issue of the patent is final 'o--but impose stringent factual require-
ments upon the Government's statutory right to annul patents for
fraud." 2 Indeed, the right of individual defendants to object to in-
fringement acts against them by interposing the defense of fraudulent
procurement was raised by the Supreme Court as a reason against
Government action.'0 3
It should be remembered, however, that these cases were all
decided prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act, and that the
Government's action as here proposed is not to annul a patent but to
attack restrictions which, it alleges, cannot be justified by a purported
patent-covering, due to the invalidity of that patent. This course of
action has been specifically sanctioned by the Supreme Court in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 0 in the following terms:
The United States does not claim that the patents are invalid
because they have been employed in violation of the Sherman
Act and that a decree should issue canceling the patents;
rather the government charges that the defendants have
violated the Sherman Act because they granted licenses under
patents which in fact were invalid. If the government were
to succeed in showing that the patents were in fact invalid,
such a finding would not in itself result in a judgment for
cancellation of the patents.
98 See generally Note, Improperly Procured Patents: FTC Jurisdiction and
Remedial Power, 77 HARv. L. Rav. 1505 (1964); Cullen & Vickers, supra note 93.
99 See generally ibid.
100 United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1897) ; United States
v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888).
101 Note, Improperly Procured Patents: FTC Jurisdiction and Remedial Power,
77 HARv. L. REv. 1505, 1509 (1964).
10 2 See United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 237-40, 267-69
(1897) ; Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Sys. Co., 169 F. Supp.
1, 21-25 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd, 268 F.2d 395 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 984
(1959).
103 United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., supra note 102, at 267. See gen-
erally Cullen & Vickers, supra note 93, at 116-17, 125-26. Private parties, on the
other hand, have similar difficulties in bringing affirmative actions to declare patents
invalid. For a recent example, see Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. v. Walker Process
Equip., Inc., 335 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 85 Sup. Ct. 657 (1965) (No.
602) (counterclaim). See also E. W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., 102 F.2d
105, 110 (6th Cir. 1939); Emhart Corp. v. Continental Can Co., TRADE RFG. REP.
(1964 Trade Cas.) 71316 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) ; I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 201
F. Supp. 411, 413-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). But cf. Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822, 827 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 944 (1964).
104 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
[Vol.l13:633
INHERENT PATENT RESTRICTIONS
In an antitrust suit instituted by a licensee against his
licensor we have repeatedly held that the licensee may attack
the validity of the patent under which he was licensed, be-
cause of the public interest in free competition, even though
the licensee has agreed in his license not to do so. . . . In
a suit to vindicate the public interest by enjoining violations
of the Sherman Act, the United States should have the same
opportunity to show that the asserted shield of patentability
does not exist.10 5
The right of the Federal Trade Commission to proceed against
restrictive arrangements carried by doubtful patents would seem
equally well established by this language."0 The previously men-
tioned American Cyanamid decision 107 indicates the feasibility of
FTC action in this field. While an evaluation of the feasibility of this
approach for the Commission of the European Economic Community
would be foolhardy, absent a thorough review of the exclusive roles
played by the various national patent offices,'" the present drive toward
a unified patent system' 09 at least makes it appropriate and likely
that the problem is now being reviewed."0 Certainly the position of
the Commission on the entire patent-antitrust relation has not yet
jelled."' The Community's powers to request harmonization of
105 Id. at 387-88 (footnote omitted); cf. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-
Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
106 See Note, Improperly Procured Patents: FTC Jurisdiction and Remedial
Power, 77 IIAv. L. REv. 1505 (1964). More specifically addressed to the type of
remedy available to the FTC is Note, Compulsory Licensing of Patents by the Federal
Trade Commission, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 543 (1964).
107TPADE REG. REP. 1[ 16527 (FTC Aug. 8, 1963).
108 For a comparative study of these roles, see Au-BAu, VERFAHREN UND RECHTS-
STELLUNG DER PATENTXMTER (Ulmer ed. 1960). On the possibilities of actions in
civil courts, see BossuNG, GRUNDFRAGEN EINER EURoPXiscHEN GERICHTSBARKEIT IN
PATENTSACHEN 33 (1959).
109 For a brief review of the efforts of the EEC to approximate national patent
laws, and the later decision to prepare a draft convention, see Stein, Assimilation of
National Laws as a Function of European Integration, 58 Am. J. INT'L L. 1, 25-27
(1964). See also BOARD OF TRADE, TRANSLATION OF A DRAFT CONVENTION RELATING TO
A EUROPEAN PATENT LAW (HMSO 1962); OUDEMANS, THE DRAFT EUROPEAN
PATENT CONVENTION (1963); 45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 153 (1963). On the motivation
and recent history of these efforts, see Robbins, The European Patent Convention--
Some Present Viewpoints of the European Patent Profession, 45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
295 (1963). A fuller study of earlier harmonization and unification efforts is REI R~,
EUROPXISIERUNG DES PATENRECHTS (1955).
110 For discussions of some of the substantive and procedural problems still being
debated, see Froschmaier, Some Aspects of the Draft Convention Relating to a
European Patent Law, 12 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE L.Q. 886 (1963). Some
variant views are expressed by Klotz, A Great Opportunity Lost?-The New Draft
Relating to a European Patent Law, 45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc' 416 (1963).
Ill See pp. 643-47 supra. In recent months there has been a renewed debate
concerning the applicability of article 36 of the Rome Treaty to prevent the proscrip-
tion of restrictive patent licenses under article 85. The Director General of Compe-
tition has rejected this argument; for the most accessible version of his position,
see VerLoren van Themaat, supra note 80, and the version in 1 COMMON MARKET L.
REv. 428 (1964). In fact he does not deny the possible applicability of article 85
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national laws to achieve Community aims give its authorities the possi-
bility of adopting some such procedure."'
D. A Suggested Analysis Into the Parties' Position
The first major line of inquiry, into the relative position of the
parties, is a more traditional undertaking, and one that is illustrated by
at least some American decisions."' An example is United States v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp.," in which the Government attacked a patent
license agreement between American Linen Supply and Crown Zeller-
bach, by which the latter received an exclusive license under patents
covering the mechanism for dispensing towels from cabinets, limited to
the eastern United States, and covering all end uses except sales to
linen or cloth towel jobbers. This field and the western part of the
country were thus reserved to American Linen Supply, apparently by
express provision to that effect in the agreement. In sustaining the
to the types of licenses discussed here. See VerLoren van Themaat, Gedanken zur
Wettbewerbspolitik im Gemeinsamen Markt, [1963] GRUR-AIT 555.
The debate was continued by Monnet, La Portie De L'Article 36 Par Rapport
A L'Article 85 Dit Traiti De La C.E.E., "Concernant les Contrats de les Licence
de Br~vexts," 12 Soc. Ec. WEr 181 (1964), who reasserts the primacy of patent
property over antitrust considerations. To this see the remarks of the Procureur
G~n6ral (Langemeijer) in Hoge Raad (Civ. Kamer), April 10, 1964 (Constructa
Werke G.m.b.H. v. De Geus en Uitdenbogerd N.V.), in 12 Soc. Ec. WEr 267, 269
(1964), and Hepp, Les Conventions de License Exchuive, 12 Soc. Ec. WEr 85 (1964).
112 Rome Treaty, art. 100. See generally Stein, Assimilation of National Laws
as a Function of European Integration, 58 Am. J. INTL L. 1 (1964).
1"3 See, e.g., Stearns v. Tinker & Rasor, 252 F.2d 589, 600-05 (9th Cir. 1958);
Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 176 F.2d 799, 803 (1st Cir.
1949), aft'd, 339 U.S. 827, 834-35 (1950); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall
Measuring Sys. Co., 169 F. Supp. 1, 28-31 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd, 268 F.2d 395 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 894 (1959). I am of the opinion that even Brownell v.
Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121, 128-30 (9th Cir. 1954), is compatible with
the text. Compare McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 166 F.2d 759, 762-63 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 813 (1948) (condemning a superfluous agreement, the aim of
which could have been achieved, via the patents, without agreement) ; Grand Caillou
Packing Co., TRADE REG. R '. 1 16927, at 21955, 21978-88 (FTC June 4, 1964) (dis-
criminatory licensing of patents).
More generally, I believe that once cases like Carbice Corp. v. American Patents
Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931), and especially Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302
U.S. 458 (1938), were decided, the analysis and methodology suggested in the text
became legitimate. Riesenfeld contends that the passage of § 271(d) of the 1952
Patent Act, 66 Stat. 811 (1952), 35 U.S.C. §271(d) (1958), did not change this
situation. The New United States Patent Act in the Light of Comparative Law,
102 U. PA. L. REv. 291, 320-21 (1954). Compare Buxton, Inc. v. Julen, Inc., 223
F. Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). For a review of the more cautious approach to this
problem in Europe, see Reimer, Vertriige iiber Patente, Gebrauchsmuster und Sorten-
schutzrechte, in GEmEINSCHAFTSKOMMENTAR 575, 583 (2d ed. 1963). See also BGH,
Decision of Aug. 8, 1960 (Kartellsenat), in 63 GRUR 627 (1961) (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
An idea of the complexity of applying the patent misuse concept to the appropriate
licensing of process patents can be gleaned from Ethyl Corp. v. Hercules Powder Co.,
232 F. Supp. 453 (D. Del. 1964).
114 141 F. Supp. 118 (N.D. Ill. 1956); accord, United States v. American Linen
Supply Co., 141 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill. 1956). For a recent case that manifests a
similar freedom to explore the economic background of such a license, see Benger
Labs., Ltd. v. R. K. Laros Co., 209 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd per curiam,
317 F.2d 455 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963).
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complaint under section 1 of the Sherman Act against a motion to
dismiss, the court discussed the possible use of both territorial and
customer restrictions to effect a restraint of trade. It assumed the
legality of territorial restrictions per se, basing its conclusion, in my
opinion erroneously, upon the assignment statute of the Patent Code." 5
It went even further and approved these clauses as "a reasonable means
for the patentee to secure the reward granted to him," I's an un-
necessary and perhaps inappropriate remark, but ruled that such
provisions are subject to antitrust scrutiny when imposed upon the
patentee "for the benefit of the licensee." 117 To the extent that this
merely condemns specific contractual restrictions upon the patentee
aliunde the patent usage, it is not particularly noteworthy. More is
involved than that, however, in two respects. First, while the court
distinguished General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co.,18s
ostensibly on the ground that in Crown Zellerbach the restrictions
regarding customers were for the licensee's benefit, in fact the "ex-
clusion" of American Linen Supply from paper sales was the natural
concomitant of its grant to Crown Zellerbach of an exclusive license
to sell to paper jobbers. Any "agreement" by Zellerbach would have
been superfluous-the limitation inhered in the exclusive partial
license. Secondly, the court criticized as unreal the nature and thus
the purpose of the "end-use" limit in this limited license:
[The] General Talking Pictures case involved separate
identifiable fields of use of the patented device; the home
radio market on the one hand, and the commercial sound
recording and reproducing market on the other. From the
3.-66 Stat. 810 (1952), 35 U.S.C. §261 (1958). For a discussion of its use to
justify restrictions, especially territorial, in licenses, see Brownell v. Ketcham Wire
& Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121, 128 (9th Cir. 1954); Note, Patent Use Restrictions, 75
HARv. L. REV. 602 (1962).
While Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., supra, is generally followed
without question, see, e.g., Lindbeck v. Wyatt Mfg. Co., 324 F.2d 807 (10th Cir.
1963), some uncertainty about territorial restrictions has been expressed. See 1963
AmEmicAN PATENT L. Ass'N BULL. 19. Compare id. at 159 (resolution of that
doubt).
The Draft European Patent Convention, see note 109 supra, contains a similar,
perhaps more purposeful, clause. Article 29(1) provided that "a European patent
may be licensed for the whole or part of the territories in which it is effective." For
an explanation of the purpose of this provision and the dispute over article 29 as a
whole due to its antitrust implications, see OUDE NsS, THE DRAFT EUROPEAN PATENT
CONVENTION 39-41 (1963) ; Weiser, Patent and Antitrust Development and Prospects
of the European Economic Community, 8 PATENT, TADEmARK & COPYRIGHT J. OF
REsEARCH & EDUCATION 1, 14-16 (1964) (interview with Dr. Franz Froschmaier,
Secretary, Working Group Patents, EEC, and comments of Dr. Eberhardt Gfinther,
President, German Federal Cartel Office).
116United States v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp. 118, 127 (N.D. Ill.
1956).
117 Id. at 127-28.
118305 U.S. 124 (1938). For the treatment of these "end-person" restrictions
in German law, see Kellermann, Die gewerblichen Schutzrechte im Gesetz gegen
Wettbewerbsbeschrinkungen, 10 WuW 603, 605-06 (1960).
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complaint it appears that the paper towel cabinets containing
ALSCO's patented parts are used in precisely the same way
by the paper jobbers allocated to Crown and by the linen
supply companies reserved to ALSCO. Simple division of a
list of potential customers in a single market presents con-
siderations not dealt with in the cited cases, considerations
that can be weighed only upon a full record disclosing the
extent of competition between paper jobbers and linen supply
companies and the intention behind the allocation."'
Why so-if limited field licenses are a "reasonable means of
securing the patentee's reward"-unless the criteria suggested in this
paper are indeed the relevant ones? The inference of the last quoted
sentence may be even more radical than necessary, if extending to a
situation where the licensor through its patents could have precluded
all competition in linen and paper towel dispensing. An actual or
potential restraint of competition beyond that exercisable by the
patent monopolist under an appropriately strict reading of its patent
coverage should probably first be found before any such license is
condemned. That aside, however, the particular language used by the
court seems to show a clear awareness that restraints attackable as
antitrust violations can occur even when cast as inherent limitations in
a unilateral license. The test is not foreclosed by the license form.
The central problem in this general line of inquiry as to the
parties' position is the disparate competitive potential of the patentee
and of his licensees. Undoubtedly it is often the licensing of patents,
not their direct use, that enables a patentee to exploit their financial
potential. It is nevertheless a matter of concern for antitrust policy
when a patent owner, which itself is a minor factor in a given com-
petitive market, restrictively licenses one or more major competitors,
even if the coverage is narrow and specifically relatable to the patent.
To use the Crown Zellerbach example again, suppose that a towel dis-
penser producer, until now active in California only, obtains patent
coverage on an improved dispenser mechanism and restrictively licenses
the two major producers in that field, which are active competitors
in the entire United States including California, one to the eastern
territory, the other to the western, excluding California. As a result
competition between the two major competitors has been ended through
a "legal" division of territory, and, incidentally, the patentee has re-
served a safe market for himself. Alone, and exploiting the patent
monopoly, the patentee was in no position to cover the demand and
would have faced competition from admittedly inferior "unimproved"




cabinets. It seems that here, too, a territorial license can, in a par-
ticular factual context, work a restraint of trade beyond that legiti-
mated by the patent monopoly and thus can be subject to normal
antitrust proscriptions.
In summary the present labels used to dispose of patent licensing
problems-"inherent restrictions," "legitimate reward," and the like--
are labels for conclusions, not aids to analysis, and should be abandoned
in favor of a more pragmatic approach. A very cursory and summary
attempt to sketch some of the factors relevant to such an approach has
been attempted. In its defense one more comment should be made.
It can be argued that all of the problems discussed could be attacked by
traditional means-that they are all extrinsic, separate, or underlying
contractual arrangements accompanying the ostensibly autonomous
patent license and are therefore in any event subject to the Sherman
Act or the Rome Treaty." ° Perhaps so. Perhaps territorial divisions
through multiple parallel licenses are only the result of prior agreement
to divide markets; "2 certainly mutual cross licenses dividing territories
could be challenged, without more. 2 But the problem is one of prac-
tice and of proof. In the Common Market especially, where the
self-policing concept leaves the enforcement agency to a great degree
at the mercy of its incoming mail, a failure to require that the Com-
mission be notified of these license arrangements, because of some
imagined conceptual barriers to their scrutiny, will result pari passu
in a failure to uncover these "underlying" agreements, which by their
nature do not often come to light save through the licenses. In the
United States the issue is more one of appropriate analysis of license
arrangements and of less timidity in reviewing them in context; the
substantive decisions, so far as can be determined from the factual
record available within each reported opinion, seem entirely reasonable
to date. 24
V. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECEMBER 21
The December 21 Announcement 25 has been indirectly criticized
by the foregoing analysis. In any realistic sense, however, this
120 See, e.g., Deringer, Komnentator zum EWG-Kartellrecht Art. 85 Abs. 1
Aninerkung 57, 13 WuW 65-66 (1963).
121 Accord, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931); see note
72 supra.
2 See note 70 supra. A good recent example is In re Automatic Tel. & Elec.
Co., Ltd.'s Application, 109 SoL. J. 28 (1965).
123 See Buxbaum, Patent Licensing: A Case Study on Antitrust Regulation
Within the European Economic Community, 9 ANTITRUST Buu.m 101, 143-44 (1964).
1.24 More accurately, I would say this of the modem, post-1945 opinions. For a
collection of cases under the relevant categories, see NORDHAUS & JUROW, PATENT-
ANTITRUST LAV 62-75 (1961).
125 See note 5 supra.
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announcement immunizes none of these challengeable practices, because
of two wide-ranging limitations by which it circumscribed the immunity
it seemed to grant:
The above statement [of per se immunity] does not
apply to patent pools, cross-licenses and multiple parallel
licenses.
126
The question of the applicability of article 85 (1) of the
Treaty to agreements . . . concerning the use of other
industrial property rights [trademarks, etc.] or of legally
unprotected "achievements" of technological benefit [know-
how] . . . must be reserved for a later decision." 7
It is difficult to conceive of any important licensing arrangements
that are completely unilateral in scope,'" s unless what are essentially
cross-licenses are fragmented into single contracts in a simple-minded
attempt to evade the notification issue and come under the immunity.
Even where a one-way license is granted, the majority of such cases
probably include at least a grant back provision, the use of which not
only precludes extension of the announcement's grant of immunity to
any such agreement, but may also make the agreement subject to
notification.'29 The only license of any significance that may fit the
narrow confines set up by the announcement is a license granted
ancillary to a dealership agreement 10 or to a sale or lease of a product
to a consumer. These are, if anything, "vertical" restraints inherent
in a particular distribution structure, not horizontal restraints between
actual or potential competitors. While these, too, should be available
for scrutiny, they are more readily acceptable than are horizontal
arrangements.
126 1962 J.O.C.E. 2918, 2922-23.
127Id. at 2923.
128For an impression of prevalent types of licenses, see Behrman, Licensing
Abroad of American-Held Patents, Trade-Marks, and Techniques, 1 PATENT, TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHT J. OF RESEARCH & EDUCATION 145 (1957); Behrman, Foreign
Licensing, id. at 220, 228; Behrman, Advantages and Disadvantages of Foreign
Licensing, 2 id. at 137, 138-41 (1958); Behrman, Licensing Abroad Under Patents,
Trademarks, and Know-How by U.S. Companies, 2 id. at 181, 220-23, 249-62; Behrman
& Schmidt, Royalty Provisions in Foreign Licensing Contracts, 3 id. 272, 281-84
(1959); Behrman & Schmidt, New Data on Foreign Licensing, 3 id. 357. For more
general impressions, see Frowein, Der deutsche Lizenzverkehr mit dein Ausland,
[1964] GRUR-AIT 565; Lichtenstein, Der Lizenzvertrag mit dem Ausland, 17 NJW
1345 (1964).
129 See Buxbaum, Patent Licensing: A Case Study on Antitrust Regulation
Within the European Economic Community, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 101, 113 (1964);
Deringer, Inhalt und Auswirkungen der ersten Kartellverordnung der europiischen
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, [1962] GRUR-AIT 283, 294.
130 See, e.g., F. C. Russell Co. v. Consumers Insulation Co., 226 F.2d 373 (3d
Cir. 1955); Skee Ball Co. v. Cohen, 286 Fed. 275 (E.D.N.Y. 1922). See also
Technical Tape Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 247 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1957).
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The limitation concerning know-how is equally important in
practice, and for the same reasons. 3' That the Commission saw fit
to exclude licenses involving know-how from the benefits of the
announcement is somewhat puzzling; most likely, the reasons were
legalistic as well as practical.'32 Know-how, though the subject of
protection by national law,'33 is not an industrial property right con-
ferred or attributed to a given thing by any official act of a national
authority, nor is it uniformly defined by each municipal legal system. 34
It has the characteristic of being consumed in the manufacturing or at
least distribution process; unlike patent rights, know-how does not
normally run with products manufactured through its use so as to
subject the unknowing purchaser to infringement-like liability. Con-
ceivably it is located at the seat of the enterprise that developed or
acquired it. This, it is understood, is the view favored by the German
Federal Cartel Office. On the other hand, while it can be licensed for
use anywhere, its vindication against illegal exploitation may depend,
as stated, upon the definition placed upon it by the law of the state
in which the use occurred, rather than of the state of the licensor's
domicile, although this approach may be qualified by the application
of certain conflict of laws doctrines."'
In any event these distinguishing characteristics apparently made
it expedient to apply article 85 to the restricted know-how license,
limited, e.g., in territory or product end use. In fact it should not be
more difficult, conceptually, to test a restriction tied to (or "inherent
in") a license of know-how under the realistic standards suggested
above than should be the case with patent licenses. The differing
131 See van Notten, Know-How Licensing in the Common; Market, 38 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 525 (1963) ; studies cited note 128 supra.
132 See Buxbaum, The Applicability of the German Cartel Law to Licenses of
Foreign Patents, 8 AxTrrRUST BULL. 925, 929-30, 931 n.16 (1963); Ladas, Legal
Protection of Know-How, 7 PATENT, TRADEnARK & COPYRIGHT J. or RESEARcH &
EDUcATioN 397, 415-17 (1963).
133 See, e.g., § 17, Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (Law against Unfair
Competition), June 7, 1909, [1909] RGBL 1499 (Ger.), as amended. Statutory protec-
tion in other European countries is more general. See Ladas, supra note 131; van
Notten, supra note 132. For a study of its treatment in German and EEC law, see
Skaupy, Know-how Vereinbarungen mind Kartellrecht, 66 GRUR 539 (1964).
134 While protection of know-how is usually treated as a problem of unfair com-
petition, its aggressive usefulness, as in restrictive licensing, makes it more properly
a subject for separate discussion. For such particular discussion, see Macdonald,
Know-How Licensing and the Antitrust Laws, 46 J. PAT. OF. Soc'y 338, 346-48
(1964) ; Nastelski, Der Schutz der Betriebsgeheinnisse, 59 GRUR 1 (1957) ; Rotondi,
Unfair Competition in Europe, 7 Am. J. ComP. L. 327, 334-37 (1958). Compare
note 133 supra, with van Notten, supra note 131, at 533 n.36. For comparative dis-
cussions of unfair competition, see, e.g., Derenberg, The Influence of the French Code
Civil on the Modern Law of Unfair Competition, 4 Am. J. Comr. L. 1 (1955);
Rotondi, Unfair Competition in Europe, 7 Am. J. Comp. L. 327 (1958).
135 See, e.g., Wengler, Laws Concerning Unfair Competition and the Conflict of
Laws, 4 Am. J. ComP. L. 167 (1955) ; van Notten, supra note 131, at 544.
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standards set up by the Commission are less an indication of any
failure to appreciate the former's nature than of the futility of its
formal approach to the latter.
The December 21 Announcement, of course, must be read in
conjunction with the definition of nonnotifiable, though not necessarily
immune, agreements found in article 4(2) of Regulation 17.18 It is
not yet possible to predict what will be the attitude of the Commission
toward patent licenses as concerns the requirement that it be notified
of all arguably harmful arrangements, whether two-party or multi-
lateral." 7 The question is not alone one of notification, since the
flagrant cases will hardly be submitted, but of establishing a policy
toward all of these agreements. While a strict policy of denying ex-
emption to many licensing arrangements will hardly encourage their
submission, it might prevent their execution in the future. The
trouble with such an approach is that it throws out the baby with the
bath water. No one disputes the legitimacy of many if not most
agreements and of their probable exempt status under article 85(3);
yet such a strict warning, when coupled with an undefined immune
area and a further undefined nonnotifiable area, puts cooperating enter-
prises to a sorry choice. They may forego doubtful arrangements or
hide their existence. Neither is a satisfactory social result. If maxi-
mum freedom to achieve technical progress is desired, without the
abandonment of a genuine antitrust enforcement policy, and if the
multiple-role prosecutor and judge-agency structure is for better or
worse continued,' then what may be needed is as universal a notifica-
tion procedure as possible. Business interests could then press
legitimate licensing arrangements to their fullest without fear of having
a tentative loophole retroactively closed. Evaluation of specific agree-
ments could go on in context, and the possible delay of a year or two
in working through them would be of much less significance than the
complete breakdown of evaluation likely at present. 39 A fuller notifica-
tion system may, as stated, bring no change in the handling of truly
illicit arrangements except to make them somewhat harder to carry
through; but it would create a healthier climate as to that greater
number of agreements which should be scrutinized both to relieve the
'
3 6 See note 4 supra.
137 This refers both to arrangements presently notifiable and to those presently
nonnotifiable, but which may in time be made subject to notification.
138 Buxbaum, Patent Licensing: A Case Study on Antitrust Regulation Within
the European Economic Community, 9 ANTrrhuST BuLL. 101, 143-44 (1964).
3.9 Appropriate use of the temporary nonnotification procedure would, admittedly,
allow a more orderly disposition of this workload, but even with relatively full noti-
fication orderly disposition should be achievable under the suggested working con-
ditions outlined in the text. See pp. 665-66 infra.
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doubts of their potential signatories and to effectuate the overriding
public policy set forth in the Rome Treaty.
The actual standards to be used in condemning or exempting
submitted agreements will have to be derived from experience. Obvi-
ously the full inquiry above outlined need hardly be undertaken for
every "inherently restrictive" patent license. Even in the horizontal
cases, a rule of per se illegality for all licenses not passing muster under
the mentioned tests would probably be too severe. The always existing,
if always uncertain, justification of an issued patent may itself be a
countervailing consideration no matter what the soundness of the patent.
In that event it might be more appropriate to proscribe only licenses
between parties enjoying an oligopolistic or substantial position in the
relevant market.' °  Certainly in vertical cases the license restraints
should be as open to a "rule of reason" defense as are identical dis-
tribution agreements not covered by patents.'I
An initial exemption might be granted for most licenses after a
low-threshold screening procedure."4  The notification system, how-
ever, could give the Commission the information necessary for allowing
140 Compare the "abuse of dominant position" regime of article 86 of the Rome
Treaty, which can be applied to the relevant activities of oligopolists. See Buxbaum,
Antitrust Regulation Within the European Economic Community, 61 CoLum. L. Ev.
402, 417 (1961) ; D=RNGER, op. cit. supra note 120.
141 At least to the extent of the review suggested in White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), and especially in the concurrence of Mr. Justice Brennan.
Id. at 264. On the merits, see Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the
Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L. REv. 795 (1962). On the review problem generally, see
Note, Patent Abuse and Antitrust: The Per Se Rule, 64 HAxv. L. REv. 626 (1951).
For an interesting recent view of the "rule of reason" as a method rather than a
substantive concept, see Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L.
REV. 23 (1964).
It has been suggested, in my opinion erroneously, that the Commission has less
discretion in this field than a "rule of reason" analysis would allow. See Beier, Die
Kartellrechtliche Beurteilung von Alleinvertriebsvertriigen int Gemeinsamen Markt
und den USA, [1964] GRUR-AIT 84, 86-87.
142 This would, however, require notification. In addition it probably could not
be satisfied by the mass ("categorical") exemption procedure as to which the Council
of Ministers is presently considering a new regulation. A translation of the draft
proposal may be found in 7 EuRoPEAN EcoNomic CoMMUIrrY BULr. (Supp. April
1964). For the instructive parliamentary debate thereon, see Europiisches Parlament,
Verhandlungen, Doc. VI/64, No. 71, at 99-112. (Sitzungsbericht, May 11-14, 1964).
See also Buxbaum, Patent Licensing: A Case Study on Antitrust Regulation
Within the European Economic Community, 9 ANTrrRuST BULL. 101, 144-44b (1964) ;
Deringer & Tessin, Gruppenausnahmen. im EWG-Kartellrecht in Aussicht, 10 AUS-
SENWIRTSCHAFTS DIENST DES Brmms-BmATms 71 (1964). For a variant approach,
see Catalano, Les Contrats dit "d'exclusivit" et I'art. 85 du Traitg C.E.E., [1964]
REcuEmn DAii-oz 173, 180 (use of an article 155 (Rome Treaty) Council directive
to fix the criteria under which the Commission should grant 85(3) exemptions).
A liberalized version of the "categorical exemption" regulation was promulgated
by the Council of Ministers on February 2, 1965. It seems to extend to patent licenses
and even to licenses of know-how, in terms broader than those used in Regulation 17.
See Ageuce Internationale D'Information pour la Presse, Europe Documents No. 302,
Feb. 6, 1965.
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it to check interesting licenses in their economic context. 4 3 In this
connection the limited duration of any exemption 144 may permit the
Commission to refuse to renew an exemption because an intervening
investigation made suspect either the industry or the firm.'4 5 While
refusal to renew is not completely discretionary, but requires changed
circumstances, 40 the fruits of such an investigation should justify a find-
ing of changed circumstances. 47 Alternatively, a "conditional exemp-
tion," pending this type of investigation, might be granted upon the
consent of the submitting parties,' who would thereby gain a degree
of immunity from official proceedings or private litigation.' 4
This is not the place to debate whether a patent misuse juris-
prudence may develop out of private litigation, particularly in the
defense of infringement actions. 5 ° Viewed from the needs of the
Commission, at least, the patent misuse doctrine may be an appropriate
tool for administrative proceedings. 5 ' In this case, however, the
analogy to United States Gypsum '5 does not seem fully appropriate:
'43 At least if field definitions in licenses are part of the material submitted. At
present the Commission permits the deletion of the technological parts of the license
(including definitions of patent coverage) in the submissions for negative attestations
and exemptions. See Forms A and B appended to Regulation 27, 1962 J.O.C.E. 118.
'44 Regulation 17, art. 8(1), 5 J.O.C.E. 207 (1962), CCH 1963 CommoN MKT.
REP. 11 2471.
145 Regulation 17, arts. 11-15, 1962 J.O.C.E. 208-10, CCH 1963 CoMMoN MKT.
REP. 1 2501-41, allow for such investigations. For a more limited view of the Com-
mission's investigatory powers in this regard, compare Wfirdinger, Zum Auskunfts-
recht der Organe der EKGS und der EWG gegeniiber privaten Unternehinen, 14
WuW 579 (1964).
1413 Regulation 17, art. 8(3) (a) 1962 J.O.C.E. 207, 1963 CCH CommoN Mir.
REP. 12471: "where the de facto situation has changed with respect to a factor
essential in the granting of the decision."
147 This is admittedly a broad reading of article 8(3) (a); however, it gives
appropriate weight to article 8(2), which requires that all the article 85(3) (Rome
Treaty) conditions essential to the granting of the original exemption continue to
exist. A finding that this is no longer the case--especially as to the one involving
the ability of the challenged practice to empower the participants to eliminate com-
petition in a substantial part of the relevant product market-, derived from such a
more intensive interim investigation, should not be precluded because of the earlier,
less well-founded exemption.
148 This approach seems permissible because of the inference in article 8(3)(b)
that stipulations may be attached to the originally granted exemption.
149Regulation 17, art 9(1), 1962 J.O.C.E. 207, 1963 CCH CoMMoN MrT. REP.
112481. For discussion see Buxbaum, Incomplete Federalism: Jurisdiction Over
Antitrust Matters in the European Economic Community, 52 CALI. L. REv. 56, 60,
68-73 (1964).
15o1 Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942). The relationship
between these matters is discussed in Stearns v. Tinker & Rasor, 252 F.2d 589, 600-01
(10th Cir. 1958). See Weiser, Antitrust Policy and Industrial Property in the Euro-
pean Economic Community, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 496, 511-12 (1963); cases cited note
113 supra.
151 But see van Notten, supra note 131, at 545 n.95 (speaking of the misuse
defense in private infringement suits). For a strong criticism of the current patent
misuse doctrines, see Nicoson, Misuse of the Misuse Doctrine in Infringement Suits,
9 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 76 (1962).
152 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
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the respondent failing the suggested tests has misused its patent and
therefore cannot claim immunity for the uncovered practices. The
agency is not invalidating the patent, but denying it effect in the par-
ticular situation.153
The present procedure cannot yet be definitely evaluated, despite
the fears expressed here. The dangers inherent in it, however, can
be suggested. The procedure may represent too costly a concession to
the enterprises to be supervised; at the same time it leaves them in
far too uncertain a position, which is bound to create further demands
for "clarification"--i.e., further substantive concessions.' M The pro-
cedure is unwieldy, while its formal nature and in part conflicting aims
will always lead to some avoidance tactics, even if the conservative
approach of full notification is adopted. 5 Nevertheless, to do less
than to embark upon this major administrative task, requiring
enormous resources and much sophistication, might be the first step
on the road to doing nothing. It may be that one way to ease the
task is to avoid conceptual snares of the kind discussed in this Article.
153 At least where the analysis stressed the "persons" involved. Where the tests
resulted in challenging scope or validity of the patents involved, the Gypsum rationale
would apply.
154 See, e.g., Gleiss & Hootz, Gruppenfreistelhngen tach EWG-Kartellrecht fMr
Alleinveririebs und Patentlizenzvertrige, 17 BarR .s-BAamx 1304 (1962).
155 See generally Bumbaum, Patent Licensing: A Case Study on Antitrust Regu-
lation Within the European Economic Community, 9 ANTITRUST Burr. 101 (1964) ;
Steindorff, Die Durchsetzung des Wettbewerbsrecht in der EWG-Wirksamkeit und
Rechtsstaatlichkeit, in ANFGABEU DER WELTBENVERBSPOLITIK IM GEmEInSAMEN MAiuet
47 (1964).
